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Abstract
With the demand for knowledge-handling systems capable of dealing with and dis-
tinguishing between various facets of imprecision ever increasing, a clear and formal
characterization of the mathematical models implementing such services is quintessen-
tial. In this paper, this task is undertaken simultaneously for the deﬁnition of impli-
cation within two settings: ﬁrst, within intuitionistic fuzzy set theory and secondly,
within interval-valued fuzzy set theory. By tracing these models back to the underlying
lattice that they are deﬁned on, on one hand we keep up with an important tradition of
using algebraic structures for developing logical calculi (e.g. residuated lattices and MV
algebras), and on the other hand we are able to expose in a clear manner the two models
formal equivalence. This equivalence, all too often neglected in literature, we exploit to
construct operators extending the notions of classical and fuzzy implication on these
structures; to initiate a meaningful classiﬁcation framework for the resulting operators,
based on logical and extra-logical criteria imposed on them; and ﬁnally, to re(de)ﬁne the
intuititive ideas giving rise to both approaches as models of imprecision and apply them
in a practical context.
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1. Introduction
Intuitionistic fuzzy sets [1] and interval-valued fuzzy sets ([54,67] and more
recently, [58]) are two intuitively straightforward extensions of Zadehs fuzzy
sets [66], that were conceived independently to alleviate some of the drawbacks
of the latter. Henceforth, for notational ease, we abbreviate ‘‘intuitionistic
fuzzy set’’ to IFS and ‘‘interval-valued fuzzy set’’ to IVFS. IFS theory basically
deﬁes the claim that from the fact that an element x ‘‘belongs’’ to a given degree
(say l) to a fuzzy set A, naturally follows that x should ‘‘not belong’’ to A to the
extent 1 l, an assertion implicit in the concept of a fuzzy set. On the con-
trary, IFSs assign to each element of the universe both a degree of membership
l and one of non-membership m such that lþ m6 1, thus relaxing the enforced
duality m ¼ 1 l from fuzzy set theory. Obviously, when lþ m ¼ 1 for all ele-
ments of the universe, the traditional fuzzy set concept is recovered. IFSs owe
their name [4] to the fact that this latter identity is weakened into an inequality,
in other words: a denial of the law of the excluded middle occurs, one of the
main ideas of intuitionism. 1
IVFS theory emerged from the observation that in a lot of cases, no ob-
jective procedure is available to select the crisp membership degrees of elements
in a fuzzy set. It was suggested to alleviate that problem by allowing to specify
only an interval [l1; l2] to which the actual membership degree is assumed to
belong. A related approach, second-order fuzzy set theory, also introduced by
Zadeh [67], goes one step further by allowing the membership degrees them-
selves to be fuzzy sets in the unit interval; this extension is not considered in
this paper.
Both approaches, IFS and IVFS theory, have the virtue of complementing
fuzzy sets, that are able to model vagueness, with an ability to model uncer-
tainty as well. 2 IVFSs reﬂect this uncertainty by the length of the interval
membership degree [l1; l2], while in IFS theory for every membership degree
1 The term ‘‘intuitionistic’’ is to be read in a ‘‘broad’’ sense here, alluding loosely to the denial of
the law of the excluded middle on element level (since lþ m < 1 is possible). A ‘‘narrow’’, graded
extension of intuitionistic logic proper has also been proposed and is due to Takeuti and Titani
[57]––it bears no relationship to Atanassovs notion of IFS theory.
2 In these pages, we juxtapose ‘‘vagueness’’ and ‘‘uncertainty’’ as two important aspects of
imprecision. Some authors [45,47,60] prefer to speak of ‘‘non-speciﬁcity’’ and reserve the term
‘‘uncertainty’’ for the global notion of imprecision.
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ðl; mÞ, the value p ¼ 1 l m denotes a measure of non-determinacy (or un-
decidedness).
Each approach has given rise to an extensive literature covering their re-
spective applications, but surprisingly very few people seem to be aware of their
equivalence, stated ﬁrst in [2] and later in [31,63]. Indeed, take any IVFS A in a
universe X , and assume that the membership degree of x in A is given as the
interval [l1; l2]. Obviously, l1 þ 1 l26 1, so by deﬁning l ¼ l1 and m ¼ 1
l2 we obtain a valid membership and non-membership degree for x in an IFS
A0. Conversely, starting from any IFS A0 we may associate to it an IVFS A by
putting, for each element x, the membership degree of x in A equal to the in-
terval [l; 1 m] with again ðl; mÞ the pair of membership/non-membership de-
grees of x in A0. As a consequence, a considerable body of work has been
duplicated by adepts of either theory, or worse, is known to one group and
ignored by the other. Therefore, regardless of the meaning (semantics) that one
likes his or her preferred approach to convey, it is worthwhile to develop the
underlying theory in a framework as abstract and general as possible. Lattices
seem to lend themselves extremely well to that purpose; indeed it is common
practice to interpret them as evaluation sets from which truth values are drawn
and to use them as a starting point for developing logical calculi. Let us apply
this strategy to the formal treatment of IVFSs and IFSs: we will describe them
as special instances of Goguens L-fuzzy sets, 3 where the appropriate evalua-
tion set will be the bounded lattice ðL; 6L Þ deﬁned as [14]:
Deﬁnition 1 (Lattice ðL; 6L Þ)
L ¼ fðx1; x2Þ 2 ½0; 12j x1 þ x26 1g
ðx1; x2Þ6L ðy1; y2Þ () x16 y1 and x2P y2
The units of this lattice are denoted 0L ¼ ð0; 1Þ and 1L ¼ ð1; 0Þ. A special
subset of L, called the diagonal D, is deﬁned by D ¼ fðx1; x2Þ 2
½0; 12j x1 þ x2 ¼ 1g. The shaded area in Fig. 1 is the set of elements x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ
belonging to L.
Note. This deﬁnition favours IFSs as they are readily seen to be L-fuzzy sets
w.r.t. this lattice, while for IVFSs a transformation from ðx1; x2Þ 2 L to the
interval [x1; 1 x2] must be performed beforehand; this decision reﬂects the
background of the authors. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that nothing
stands in our way to deﬁne equivalently:
LI ¼ fðx1; x2Þ 2 ½0; 12j x16 x2g
3 Let ðL; 6 LÞ be a complete lattice. An L-fuzzy set in U is an U ! L mapping [36].
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ðx1; x2Þ 6LI ðy1; y2Þ () x16 y1 and x26 y2
and develop the theory in terms of ðLI ; 6 LI Þ. For compliance with the existing
literature, we denote the class of L-fuzzy sets in a universe U by FL ðUÞ.
Note. In this paper, if x 2 L, we refer to its and ﬁrst and second components
by x1 and x2 respectively. In case we want to refer to the individual components
of an expression like f ðxÞ, where in this case for instance f is an L ! L
mapping, we write pr1f ðxÞ and pr2f ðxÞ, where the projections pr1 and pr2 map
an ordered pair (in this case an element of L) to its ﬁrst and second compo-
nent, respectively.
The lattice ðL; 6L Þ is a complete lattice: for each A  L, supA ¼
ðsupfx 2 ½0; 1jð9y 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞg; inffy 2 ½0; 1jð9x 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞgÞ
and inf A ¼ ðinffx 2 ½0; 1jð9y 2 ½0; 1Þððx; yÞ 2 AÞg; supfy 2 ½0; 1jð9x 2 ½0; 1Þ
ððx; yÞ 2 AÞgÞ.
As is well known, every lattice ðL; 6 Þ has an equivalent deﬁnition as an
algebraic structure ðL;^;_Þ where the meet operator ^ and the join operator _
are linked to the ordering 6 by the following equivalence, for a; b 2 L:
a6 b() a _ b ¼ b() a ^ b ¼ a
The operators ^ and _ on ðL; 6L Þ are deﬁned as follows, for
ðx1; y1Þ; ðx2; y2Þ 2 L:
ðx1; y1Þ ^ ðx2; y2Þ ¼ ðminðx1; x2Þ;maxðy1; y2ÞÞ
ðx1; y1Þ _ ðx2; y2Þ ¼ ðmaxðx1; x2Þ;minðy1; y2ÞÞ
This algebraic structure will be the basis for our subsequent investigations. In
the next section, entitled ‘‘Preliminaries’’ the most important operations on
ðL; 6L Þ are deﬁned, notably: triangular norms and conorms, negators and
implicators. They model the basic logical operations of conjunction, disjunc-
tion, negation and implication. Implicators on L will be the main point of in-
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the set L.
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terest in the remainder of the paper: in Section 3 we review construction tech-
niques for them, Section 4 examines their classiﬁcation w.r.t. a number of cri-
teria imposed on them while Section 5 embeds the results into the frameworks of
well-known logical calculi such as residuated lattices and MV algebras. Section
6 then puts the focus back on the models that we started out with: IFSs and
IVFSs, and describes their applicability in the ﬁeld of approximate reasoning.
Future opportunities and challenges are also discussed in that section.
2. Preliminaries
In the literature on IFSs and IVFSs, several methods for constructing
connectives have emerged, their rationale typically based on speciﬁc consid-
erations taken in the light of the actual framework for which they were de-
veloped. While most of them have the advantage of being readily understood
by anyone familiar with that framework, they are not always the most general
nor the most suitable ones that could be deﬁned. Therefore, to put matters in as
wide as possible a perspective, in this and the next section, we introduce logical
connectives simply as algebraic mappings on L, regardless of their interpre-
tation in the context of a speciﬁc model. We recall the deﬁnitions of the main
logical operations in ðL; 6L Þ, as well as some of the representation results
established earlier and obtained in the framework of an extensive study on
intuitionistic fuzzy triangular norms and conorms [27–29].
Deﬁnition 2 (Negator on L). A negator on L is any decreasing L ! L
mapping N satisfying Nð0L Þ ¼ 1L , Nð1L Þ ¼ 0L . If NðNðxÞÞ ¼ x 8x 2 L,
N is called an involutive negator.
The mapping Ns, deﬁned as Nsðx1; x2Þ ¼ ðx2; x1Þ 8ðx1; x2Þ 2 L, will be
called the standard negator. Involutive negators on L can always be related to
an involutive negator on ½0; 1, as the following theorem shows [29].
Theorem 1. Let N be an involutive negator on L, and let the ½0; 1 ! ½0; 1
mapping N be defined by, for a 2 ½0; 1, NðaÞ ¼ pr1Nða; 1 aÞ. Then for all
ðx1; x2Þ 2 L :Nðx1; x2Þ ¼ ðNð1 x2Þ; 1 Nðx1ÞÞ.
Since 6L is a partial ordering, an order-theoretic deﬁnition of conjunction
and disjunction on L as triangular norms and conorms, t-norms and t-
conorms for short, respectively, arises quite naturally:
Deﬁnition 3 (Triangular Norm on L). A t-norm on L is any increasing, com-
mutative, associative ðLÞ2 ! L mapping T satisfying Tð1L ; xÞ ¼ x for all
x 2 L.
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Deﬁnition 4 (Triangular Conorm on L). A t-conorm on L is any increasing,
commutative, associative ðLÞ2 ! L mapping S satisfying Sð0L ; xÞ ¼ x, for
all x 2 L.
Obviously, the greatest t-norm with respect to the ordering 6L is Min,
deﬁned by Min ðx; yÞ ¼ x ^ y; the smallest t-conorm w.r.t. 6L is Max, deﬁned
by Max ðx; yÞ ¼ x _ y for all x; y 2 L. Note that it does not hold that
for all x; y 2 L, either Min ðx; yÞ ¼ x or Min ðx; yÞ ¼ y. For instance,
Min ðð0:1; 0:3Þ; ð0:2; 0:4ÞÞ ¼ ð0:1; 0:4Þ.
Involutive negators on L are always linked to an associated fuzzy con-
nective (a negator on ½0; 1); the same does not always hold true for t-norms
and t-conorms, however. We therefore have to introduce the following deﬁ-
nition [16]:
Deﬁnition 5 (t-representability). A t-normT on L (respectively t-conormS) is
called t-representable if there exists a t-norm T and a t-conorm S on ½0; 1
(respectively a t-conorm S0 and a t-norm T 0 on ½0; 1) such that, for x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ,
y ¼ ðy1; y2Þ 2 L,
Tðx; yÞ ¼ ðT ðx1; y1Þ; Sðx2; y2ÞÞ
Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðS0ðx1; y1Þ; T 0ðx2; y2ÞÞ
T and S (respectively S0 and T 0) are called the representants of T (respectively
S).
Example 1. Consider the following mappings on L:
S1ðx; yÞ ¼ ðx1 þ y1  x1y1; x2y2Þ
S2ðx; yÞ ¼
x if y ¼ 0L
y if x ¼ 0L
ðmaxð1 x2; 1 y2Þ;minðx2; y2ÞÞ else
8><
>:
It is easily veriﬁed that they are t-conorms. The ﬁrst one is t-representable with
the probabilistic sum and algebraic product on ½0; 1 as representants. It is an
extension of the probabilistic sum t-conorm to L. The second one is not t-
representable, since its ﬁrst component depends also on x2 and y2. It is an
extension of the max t-conorm to L.
The theorem below states the conditions under which a pair of connectives
on ½0; 1 gives rise to a t-representable t-norm (t-conorm) on L.
Theorem 2 [16]. Given a t-norm T and t-conorm S on ½0; 1 satisfying
T ða; bÞ6 1 Sð1 a; 1 bÞ for all a; b 2 ½0; 1, the mappings T and S defined
by, for x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ and y ¼ ðy1; y2Þ in L:
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Tðx; yÞ ¼ ðT ðx1; y1Þ; Sðx2; y2ÞÞ;
Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðSðx1; y1Þ; T ðx2; y2ÞÞ;
are a t-norm and a t-conorm on L, respectively.
Note. The discovery of a mapping like S2, ﬁrst mentioned in [16], rules out
the conjecture, implicit in most of the existing literature (see e.g. [7,14,35,41]),
that interval-valued or intuitionistic fuzzy t-norms and t-conorms are neces-
sarily characterized by a pair of fuzzy connectives on which some condition (cf.
Theorem 2) is imposed to assure that the result of an operation belongs to the
evaluation set. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4, implicators based on t-
representable operators do not inherit as much of the desirable properties of
their fuzzy counterparts as we would like them to, a defect that can be mended
by considering non-t-representable extensions for the implicator construction.
The dual of a t-norm T on L (t-conorm S) w.r.t. a negator N is the
mapping T (respectively S) deﬁned by, for x; y 2 L,
Tðx; yÞ ¼NðTðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ
ðrespectively Sðx; yÞ ¼NðSðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞÞ
It can be veriﬁed that T is a t-conorm and S is a t-norm on L. Moreover,
the dual t-norm (t-conorm) with respect to an involutive negatorN on L of a
t-representable t-conorm (t-norm) is t-representable [29].
In [29] a representation theorem for t-norms on L meeting a number of
criteria was formulated and proven.
Theorem 3. T is a continuous t-norm on L satisfying
• ð8x 2 L n f0L ; 1LgÞðTðx; xÞ <L xÞ (archimedean property)
• ð9x; y 2 LÞ (x1 6¼ 0 and x2 6¼ 0 and y1 6¼ 0 and y2 6¼ 0 and Tðx; yÞ ¼ 0L)
(strong nilpotency)
• ð8x; y; z 2 LÞðTðx; zÞ6L y () z6L supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L ygÞ (residuation
principle)
• ð8x; y 2 DÞðsupfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg 2 DÞ
• Tðð0; 0Þ; ð0; 0ÞÞ ¼ 0L
if and only if there exists an increasing continuous permutation u of ½0; 1 such
that for all x; y 2 L,
Tðx; yÞ ¼ ðu1ðmaxð0;uðx1Þ þ uðy1Þ  1ÞÞ; 1 u1ðmaxð0;uðx1Þ
þ uð1 y2Þ  1;uðy1Þ þ uð1 x2Þ  1ÞÞÞ
or equivalently, there exists a continuous increasing permutation U of L such
that U1 is increasing and such thatT ¼ U1 TW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ, where
TW , the Łukasiewicz t-norm on L, is defined by, for x; y 2 L:
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TW ðx; yÞ ¼ ðmaxð0; x1 þ y1  1Þ;minð1; x2 þ 1 y1; y2 þ 1 x1ÞÞ
The list of imposed conditions on T seems overwhelming, but on closer
inspection the relationship with the analogous result in fuzzy set theory (rep-
resentation of continuous, archimedean, nilpotent t-norms on ½0; 1, see e.g.
[46]) becomes obvious, so it is justiﬁed to state that Theorem 3 constitutes a
conservative extension of that result. A generalization of Theorem 3 can be
found in [30].
The ﬁnal and for our present purposes most important construct is that of
an implicator on L. Our deﬁnition includes a very wide class of mappings on
L; the task of classiﬁcation (Section 3) will be to select from this class those
implicators that are, in a way, the most appropriate ones.
Deﬁnition 6 (Implicator on L). An implicator on L is any ðLÞ2 ! L-mapping
I satisfying Ið0L ; 0L Þ ¼ 1L , Ið1L ; 0L Þ ¼ 0L , Ið0L ; 1L Þ ¼ 1L , Ið1L ; 1L Þ ¼
1L . Moreover we require I to be decreasing in its ﬁrst, and increasing in its
second component.
3. Construction of Implicators on L*
The purpose of this section is to give the reader some feeling for the sheer
multitude of connectives that ﬁt Deﬁnition 6, by providing a number of il-
lustrative examples, and also to arm ourselves suﬃciently well for the classi-
ﬁcation task that awaits us in the next section, by putting some structure into
the class of implicators on L: as a point of departure, we extend the common
notions of S- and R-implicators from fuzzy set theory to L [16,27], an ap-
proach that has the virtue of being the algebraically most straightforward and
ﬂexible one (w.r.t. classiﬁcation). The story does not end there, however, as the
eclectic literature on intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued connectives has
bequeathed us with some operators outside the above-mentioned classes but in
line with Deﬁnition 6 and with varying usefulness.
3.1. Strong implicators on L
Strong implicators, or shortly S-implicators, on the unit interval emerged by
paraphrasing the equivalence between the formulas P ! Q and :P _ Q in bi-
nary propositional logic using a negator and a t-conorm. A straightforward
extension to L presents itself as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 (S-implicator on L). Let S be a t-conorm andN a negator on L.
The S-implicator generated by S andN is the mapping IS;N deﬁned as, for
x; y 2 L:
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IS;Nðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ
If S is t-representable, IS;N is called a t-representable S-implicator on L.
It can be veriﬁed that the resulting construct satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6 regardless
ofN andS. Below we present some common examples of S-implicators on L;
for every operator thus deﬁned we also quote the corresponding connective on
the unit interval that this implicator extends. Note especially how a single
implicator on ½0; 1 gives way to several extensions, with––as will become clear
in the next section––signiﬁcantly diﬀering properties.
Example 2. Let S ¼Max andN ¼Ns. Then
IMax;Nsðx; yÞ ¼ ðmaxðx2; y1Þ;minðx1; y2ÞÞ
IMax;Ns is an extension of the Kleene–Dienes implicator on ½0; 1,
Ibðx; yÞ ¼ maxð1 x; yÞ for all x; y 2 ½0; 1. Since Max is the smallest t-conorm
on L, IMax;Nsðx; yÞ6L IS;Nsðx; yÞ for arbitrary t-conorm S on L and for all
x; y 2 L. This implicator occurred in literature previously in the work of e.g.
Atanassov and Gargov [3,5] on IFSs.
Example 3. Let Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; x1 þ y1Þ;maxð0; x2 þ y2  1ÞÞ for all x; y 2 L
andN ¼Ns. Then
IS;Nsðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; x2 þ y1Þ;maxð0; x1 þ y2  1ÞÞ
IS;Ns is an extension of the Łukasiewicz implicator on ½0; 1, Iaðx; yÞ ¼
minð1; 1 xþ yÞ for all x; y 2 ½0; 1.
Example 4. Let Sðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; x1 þ 1 y2; y1 þ 1 x2Þ;maxð0; x2 þ y2  1ÞÞ
for all x; y 2 L (i.e. S ¼ SW , the dual of the Łukasiewicz t-norm TW ) and
N ¼Ns. Then
ISW ;Nsðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; y1 þ 1 x1; x2 þ 1 y2Þ;maxð0; x1 þ y2  1ÞÞ
ISW ;Ns is another extension of the Łukasiewicz implicator on ½0; 1. It is also an
example of a non-t-representable S-implicator.
3.2. Residual implicators on L
Another way of deﬁning implication in classical logic is to consider the
equivalence
P ! Q  supfX 2 f0; 1gjP ^ X 6Qg
and fuzzify it, using a t-norm, to obtain the deﬁnition of residual implicators
on ½0; 1, or R-implicators for short.
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Deﬁnition 8 (R-implicator on L). Let T be a t-norm on L. The R-implicator
generated by T is the mapping IT deﬁned as, for x; y 2 L:
ITðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg
If T is t-representable, IT is called a t-representable R-implicator on L.
Again, the above-deﬁned mappings are implicators on L in the sense of
Deﬁnition 6. Some of them have occurred previously in literature; for instance,
in [41], Jenei already introduced the class of t-representable R-implicators on L
in the speciﬁc setting of IVFSs.
Due to the supremum operation appearing in their deﬁnition, it is not al-
ways straightforward to derive an explicit form for R-implicators on L, as the
examples below show.
Example 5. LetTðx;yÞ¼Minðx;yÞ¼ðminðx1;y1Þ;maxðx2;y2ÞÞ for all x;y2L. Then
IMinðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 Ljðminðx1; c1Þ;maxðx2; c2ÞÞ6L yg
We now derive an explicit formula for IMin:
• If x16 y1 and x2P y2, then minðx1; c1Þ6 x16 y1 8c1 2 ½0; 1 and
maxðx2; c2ÞP x2P y2 8c2 2 ½0; 1. Hence, in that case, IMinðx; yÞ ¼ 1L .
• If x16 y1 and x2 < y2, then still minðx1; c1Þ6 x16 y1 8c1 2 ½0; 1, but
maxðx2; c2ÞP y2 if and only if c2P y2, hence inffc2 2 ½0; 1jmaxðx2; c2ÞP
y2g ¼ y2. We conclude that IMinðx; yÞ ¼ ð1 y2; y2Þ.
• If x1 > y1 and x2P y2, then still maxðx2; c2ÞP x2P y2 8c2 2 ½0; 1, but
minðx1; c1Þ6 y1 if and only if c16 y1, hence supfc1 2 ½0; 1jminðx1; c1Þ6
y1g ¼ y1. We conclude that IMinðx; yÞ ¼ ðy1; 0Þ.
• If x1 > y1 and x2 < y2, then
supfc1 2 ½0; 1jminðx1; c1Þ6 y1g ¼ y1
inffc2 2 ½0; 1jmaxðx2; c2ÞP y2g ¼ y2
Since y 2 L, we may conclude that IMinðx; yÞ ¼ ðy1; y2Þ.
To summarize, we obtain:
IMinðx; yÞ ¼
1L if x16 y1 and x2P y2
ð1 y2; y2Þ if x16 y1 and x2 < y2
ðy1; 0Þ if x1 > y1 and x2P y2
ðy1; y2Þ if x1 > y1 and x2 < y2
8><
>>:
IMin is an extension of the G€odel implicator on ½0; 1, deﬁned by, for
x; y 2 ½0; 1:
Igðx; yÞ ¼ 1 if x6 yy otherwise

Since Min is the greatest t-norm on L, IMin is the smallest R-implicator on L.
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Example 6. Let Tðx; yÞ ¼ ðmaxð0; x1 þ y1  1Þ;minð1; x2 þ y2ÞÞ. Then
ITðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 Ljðmaxð0; x1 þ c1  1Þ;minð1; x2 þ c2ÞÞ6L yg
To ﬁnd an explicit formula for IT, we distinguish between the following cases:
• If x16 y1 and x2P y2, then clearly x1 þ c1  16 y1 and x2 þ c2P
y2 8ðc1; c2Þ 2 L. It follows easily that ITðx; yÞ ¼ 1L .
• If x16 y1 and x2 < y2, then still x1 þ c1  16 y1 8c1 2 ½0; 1. The expression
x2 þ c2P y2 is equivalent to c2P y2  x2. But y2  x2 > 0. Hence inffc2 2
½0; 1jx2 þ c2P y2g ¼ y2  x2. So ITðx; yÞ ¼ ð1 ðy2  x2Þ; y2  x2Þ ¼ ð1
y2 þ x2; y2  x2Þ:
• If x1 > y1 and x2P y2 then x2 þ c2P y2 8c2 2 ½0; 1. The condition
x1 þ c1  16 y1 is equivalent to c16 1þ y1  x1. But now 1þ y1  x1 < 1,
so supfc1 2 ½0; 1jx1 þ c1  16 y1g ¼ 1þ y1  x1. Hence ITðx; yÞ ¼ ð1þ
y1  x1; 0Þ.
• If x1 > y1 and x2 < y2, then x1 þ c1  16 y1 is equivalent to c16 1þ y1  x1,
and x2 þ c2P y2 is equivalent to c2P y2  x2. Since we also require
c1 þ c26 1, we need to ﬁnd the supremum (in L) of the set of ðc1; c2Þs that
satisfy the following array of inequalities:
c16 1þ y1  x1
c2P y2  x2
c1 þ c26 1
8<
: ð1Þ
Fig. 2 shows the set of solutions (shaded area) to this array of inequalities
graphically; depending on the position of x and y we have to distinguish
between two possible situations, denoted (a) and (b) in the ﬁgure.
It is clear that in each case the supremum of the shaded area is equal to:
ITðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1 y2 þ x2; 1þ y1  x1Þ; y2  x2Þ
Fig. 2. (a) 1 y2 þ x2 < 1þ y1  x1; (b) 1 y2 þ x2P 1þ y1  x1.
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In summary we get:
ITðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; 1þ y1  x1; 1þ x2  y2Þ;maxð0; y2  x2ÞÞ
IT is an extension of the Łukasiewicz implicator on ½0; 1 (see Examples 3
and 4).
Example 7. Let T ¼TW , the Łukasiewicz t-norm on L. Then
ITW ðx; yÞ
¼ supfc 2 Ljðmaxð0; x1 þ c1 1Þ;minð1;x2þ 1 c1; c2þ 1 x1ÞÞ6L yg
To ﬁnd an explicit expression for ITW , let x; y; c 2 L. Then
TW ðx; cÞ6L y
() maxð0; x1 þ c1  1Þ6 y1 and minð1; x2 þ 1 c1; c2 þ 1 x1ÞP y2
() x1 þ c1  16 y1 and x2 þ 1 c1P y2 and c2 þ 1 x1P y2
() c16 y1 þ 1 x1 and c16 x2 þ 1 y2 and c2P y2 þ x1  1
() c16 minð1; y1 þ 1 x1; x2 þ 1 y2Þ and c2P maxð0; y2 þ x1  1Þ
The last formula holds because c is an element of L. Hence we ob-
tainITW ðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTW ðx; cÞ6L yg ¼ ðminð1; y1 þ 1 x1; x2 þ 1 y2Þ;
maxð0; y2 þ x1  1ÞÞ.
Note especially that ITW ¼ ISW ;Ns , and thus it also extends the Łuka-
siewicz implicatorIa on ½0; 1. This should not come as a surprise since in fuzzy
logic the Łukasiewicz implicator is both an R- and an S-implicator.
3.3. Miscellaneous implicators and related operators on L outside the previous
classes
The phrase ‘‘Implicators and Related Operators on L’’ in the title of this
subsection owes to the fact that not all the ‘‘implicators’’ deﬁned so far within
the literature on IFSs and IVFSs meet the criteria set by Deﬁnition 6. It is
deﬁnitely not our goal to produce an exhaustive list of all possible alternatives;
we merely quote some of the more interesting examples.
Example 8 (Two alternative extensions of G€odel implication). In Example 5, we
constructed an R-implicator on L that was an extension of Ig, the G€odel im-
plicator (itself also an R-implicator) on ½0; 1. Below we outline two alternative
generalizations of Ig, neither of which is an R-implicator (or an S-implicator,
for that matter) on L.
The ﬁrst one was deﬁned in [3] by Atanassov and Gargov as an implication
operator for intuitionistic fuzzy logic; in the context of ðL; 6L Þ it can be
paraphrased as:
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Iagðx; yÞ ¼
1L if x16 y1
ðy1; 0Þ if x1 > y1 and x2P y2
ðy1; y2Þ if x1 > y1 and x2 < y2
8<
:
Let us start by proving that Iag is not an S-implicator; suppose Iagðx; yÞ ¼
SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L, S a t-conorm and N a negator on L. Since
SðNðxÞ; 0L Þ ¼NðxÞ, we ﬁnd
NðxÞ ¼ Iagðx; 0L Þ ¼ 1L if x1 ¼ 00L otherwise

Now put x ¼ ð0:25; 0:45Þ, thenNðxÞ ¼ 0L and Sð0L ; yÞ ¼ y regardless of S.
But if e.g. y ¼ ð0:1; 0:3Þ, thenIagðx; yÞ ¼ ð0:1; 0Þ 6¼ y. Thus, there does not exist
such an S and hence Iag is not an S-implicator.
Secondly, suppose that Iagðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg for all
x; y 2 L, andT a t-norm on L. Let x 2 L n D such that x1; x2 > 0, g 2 L such
that g <L1L and g1 < x1 and 1 x1 > g2 > 0 (this is always possible since
x 62 D). Then Tðx; gÞ6L ðx1; 1 x1Þ holds, 4 so pr2Tðx; gÞP 1 x1. Similarly,
Tðg; xÞ6L ðg1; 1 g1Þ, so pr2Tðx; gÞ ¼ pr2Tðg; xÞP 1 g1. Thus,
pr2Tðx; gÞP maxð1 x1; 1 g1Þ
Now put y ¼ ðg1; 1 x1Þ, so pr2Tðx; gÞP 1 x1 ¼ y2. On the other hand,
pr1Tðx; gÞ6 minðx1; g1Þ ¼ g1 ¼ y1, and thus g 2 fc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg. But
then supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L ygP Lg >L ðg1; 1 x1Þ ¼ y, a contradiction since
Iagðx; yÞ ¼ y. Hence Iag is not an R-implicator.
The second extension of Ig we present here may be considered in some way
its most genuine generalization to L. Deﬁned by, for x; y 2 L:
IGðx; yÞ ¼ 1L if x6L yy otherwise

it is however an implicator without a representation as an S- or R-implicator.
To check this, suppose IGðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L, S a t-conorm
andN a negator on L. We ﬁnd
NðxÞ ¼ IGðx; 0L Þ ¼ 1L if x ¼ 0L0L otherwise

Suppose now that x 6¼ 0L and x6L y <L 1L . In that case we ﬁnd
SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ Sð0L ; yÞ ¼ y <L 1L ¼ IGðx; yÞ, a contradiction. Hence, IG is
not an S-implicator.
4 Indeed, since x16 x1, Iagðx; ðx1; 1 x1ÞÞ ¼ 1L ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L ðx1; 1 x1Þg, so for all
c 2 L such that c2 > 0, we have Tðx; cÞ6L ðx1; 1 x1Þ.
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Suppose on the other hand that Igðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg for all
x; y 2 L, and T a t-norm on L. Choose x; y 2 L n D such that x1 > y1 and
x2P y2 > 0. Then Igðx; yÞ ¼ ðy1; y2Þ by assumption. On the other hand,
ITðx; yÞP LIMinðx; yÞ ¼ ðy1; 0Þ (see Example 5), since Min is the greatest
t-norm on L. But ðy1; 0Þ >L ðy1; y2Þ, again a contradiction. Hence, IG is no
R-implicator either.
Example 9 (Aggregated implicators on L). In [9] Bustince et al. constructed
implication operators for intuitionistic fuzzy logic based on aggregation op-
erators on ½0; 1. Recall that an aggregation operator is a ½0; 12 ! ½0; 1 map-
ping M that satisﬁes the following conditions:
(1) Mð0; 0Þ ¼ 0
(2) Mð1; 1Þ ¼ 1
(3) M is increasing in its ﬁrst and in its second argument
(4) Mðx; yÞ ¼ Mðy; xÞ for all x; y 2 ½0; 1
They proved that if I is an implicator and N an involutive negator on
½0; 1, and M1, M2, M3, and M4 are aggregation operators such that M1ðx; yÞþ
M3ð1 x; 1 yÞP 1 andM2ðx; yÞ þM4ð1 x; 1 yÞ6 1 for all x; y 2 ½0; 1, then
I deﬁned by, for all x; y 2 L,
Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðIðM1ðx1; 1 x2Þ;M2ðy1; 1 y2ÞÞ;NðIðNðM3ðx2; 1 x1ÞÞ;
NðM4ðy2; 1 y1ÞÞÞÞÞ
is an implicator on L in the sense of Deﬁnition 6.
As a simple instance of this class, putting M1 ¼ M3 ¼ max, M2 ¼ M4 ¼ min
and I the Kleene–Dienes implicator on ½0; 1, we obtain the S-implicator from
Example 2. More interesting implicators emerge when the aggregation opera-
tors are chosen strictly between min and max, i.e. minðx; yÞ < Miðx; yÞ <
maxðx; yÞ, for some x; y 2 ½0; 1 and i ¼ 1; . . . ; 4. For instance, putting M1 ¼
M2 ¼ M3 ¼ M4 ¼ M with Mðx; yÞ ¼ xþy2 for all x; y 2 ½0; 1, we obtain the fol-
lowing implicator I on L:
IBðx;yÞ¼ max 1 x1þ x2
2
;
1 y2þ y1
2
 
;min
1 x2þ x1
2
;
1 y1þ y2
2
  
This implicator has no representation in terms of S- nor R-implicators. Indeed,
suppose IBðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ for all x; y 2 L, S a t-conorm and N a ne-
gator on L. Put x ¼ 1L ; y ¼ ð12; 14Þ. Then
IBðx; yÞ ¼ max 1 1þ 0
2
;
1 1
4
þ 1
2
2
 
;min
1 0þ 1
2
;
1 1
2
þ 1
4
2
  
¼ 5
8
;
3
8
 
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On the other hand,SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼Sð0L ; yÞ ¼ y 6¼ ð58; 38Þ, a contradiction, so IB
cannot be an S-implicator.
Suppose on the other hand that IBðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg for all
x; y 2 L, and T a t-norm on L. Put x ¼ y ¼ ð1
4
; 1
4
Þ. Then IBðx; yÞ ¼ ð12; 12Þ. But
IMinðx; yÞ ¼ 1L , thus IBðx; yÞjLIMinðx; yÞ and hence IB has no representa-
tion as an R-implicator.
Example 10 (Wu implicator on L). The mapping Iwu on L deﬁned by, for
x; y 2 L:
Iwuðx; yÞ ¼ 1L if x6L yMinðNsðxÞ; yÞ otherwise

is an implicator on L: if x6L x0, then it follows easily that Iwuðx; yÞPL
Iwuðx0; yÞ, since 1LP LMinðNsðxÞ; yÞ, and x6L x0 implies MinðNsðxÞ; yÞPL
MinðNsðx0Þ; yÞ. If y6L y0, then MinðNsðxÞ; yÞ6 L MinðNsðxÞ; y 0Þ6L 1L ,
from which follows easily that Iwuðx; yÞ6L Iwuðx; y 0Þ.
Iwu is an extension of the implicator on ½0; 1 introduced by Wu in [64].
Since that implicator is neither an S- nor an R-implicator, the Wu implicator
on L likewise is not.
We conclude with an example of a mapping that was designated as an in-
tuitionistic fuzzy implicator, but in fact does not meet the criteria of Deﬁnition 6.
Example 11. In [3], Atanassov and Gargov deﬁned the following ðLÞ2 ! L
mapping J :
Jðx; yÞ ¼
1L if x6L y
ðy1; x2Þ if x1 > y1 and x2P y2
ðx1; y2Þ if x16 y1 and x2 < y2
0L if x >L y
8><
>:
It is not decreasing in its ﬁrst component. Indeed, put x ¼ ð0:6; 0:2Þ,
x0 ¼ ð0:7; 0:15Þ and y ¼ ð0:4; 0:1Þ. Then x6L x0, but Jðx; yÞ ¼ ð0:4; 0:2Þ <L
Jðx0; yÞ ¼ ð0:4; 0:15Þ.
4. Classiﬁcation of implicators on L*: an algebraic approach
The task of classifying implicators deﬁned within any many-valued exten-
sion of classical binary propositional logic essentially comes down to checking
how many desirable properties of the original operation are kept by the ex-
tended structure. Therefore, regardless of background and goals, inspiration
for this process draws primarily from logic, and the notion of a tautology
(meaning a formula whose truth value is always 1L , regardless of the truth
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values of its constituents), or a weakened version of it, 5 will play an important
role in it.
Fuzzy logics, as examples of well-studied many-valued truth structures, have
shown how an algebraic treatment––translating desirable properties into alge-
braic laws (or axioms) to be satisﬁed, and subsequently tracing the shape an
implicator should have in order to satisfy a list of axioms––can shed a systematic
and pragmatical light on the subject by providing a yardstick method for ‘‘mea-
suring’’ the usefulness of implicators. We pursue this strategy for implicators on
L, taking as our point of departure an extended version of the Smets–Magrez
axioms and ﬁnishing oﬀwith an algebraic representation of implicators satisfying
the entire axiom list. This strategy is therefore dubbed an ‘‘algebraic approach’’.
4.1. Axioms of Smets and Magrez
In [55], Smets and Magrez outlined an axiom scheme for implicators on
½0; 1. They took a number of important tautologies from classical logic,
translated them into four algebraic axioms and complemented the scheme with
monotonicity (A.1) and continuity (A.6) requirements that emerge naturally
when we swap the discrete space {0,1} for the continuum ½0; 1. Smets–Magrez
axioms stand as a yardstick to test the suitability of implicators on ½0; 1; it is
therefore instructive to generalize them to L:
Deﬁnition 9 (Smets–Magrez axioms for an implicator I on L)
(A.1) (8y 2 L) (Ið:; yÞ is decreasing in L) and (8x 2 L) (Iðx; :Þ is increasing
in L) (monotonicity laws)
(A.2) (8x 2 L) (Ið1L ; xÞ ¼ x) (neutrality principle)
(A.3) 8ðx; yÞ 2 ðLÞ2
 
(Iðx; yÞ ¼ IðNIðyÞ;NIðxÞÞ (contrapositivity)
(A.4) 8ðx; y; zÞ 2 ðLÞ3
 
(Iðx;Iðy; zÞÞ ¼ Iðy;Iðx; zÞÞ) (interchangeability
principle)
(A.5) 8ðx; yÞ 2 ðLÞ2
 
(x6L y () Iðx; yÞ ¼ 1L) (conﬁnement principle)
(A.6) I is a continuous ðLÞ2 ! L mapping (continuity).
5 In concreto, we think about the following two possible variations on a tautology:
• Fuzzy tautologies [49], formulas whose truth values ðx1; x2Þ are such that x1P 0:5.
• Intuitionistic fuzzy tautologies [3], formulas whose truth values ðx1; x2Þ are such that
x1P x2.
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Note. In axiom 3, the mapping NI, deﬁned by NIðxÞ ¼ Iðx; 0L Þ, is a
negator on L. It is called the negator induced by I. It can be easily veriﬁed
that if (A.2) and (A.3) hold, then necessarilyNI is involutive.
In what follows, we ﬁrst conduct a detailed investigation to verify if and
under which conditions the implicators of the previous section satisfy the
various Smets–Magrez axioms. Afterwards, we proceed to derive an algebraic
expression for general implicators on L satisfying the six axioms simulta-
neously. In this context, we need to introduce some additional terminology: an
implicator in the sense of Deﬁnition 6 is called a border implicator if it satisﬁes
the neutrality principle (A.2); a contrapositive border implicator additionally
satisfying the interchangeability principle (A.4) is called a model implicator; and
ﬁnally, a continuous model implicator for which (A.5) is also veriﬁed, is called
a Łukasiewicz implicator.
4.2. Smets–Magrez axioms for S- and R-implicators on L
As can be seen from Deﬁnition 9, axiom 1 merely asserts the monotonicity
conditions incorporated into the deﬁnition of implicators on L. It is kept in the
list for reasons of tradition, but will not occur in the following discussion.
4.2.1. S-implicators
Theorem 4. An S-implicator IS;N on L is a model implicator on the condition
thatN is involutive.
Proof. We verify that each of the axioms (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) is fulﬁlled. Let
x; y; z 2 L.
ðA:2Þ IS;Nð1L ; xÞ ¼SðNð1L Þ; xÞ
¼ Sð0L ; xÞ
¼ x
ðA:3Þ IS;NðIS;Nðy; 0L Þ;IS;Nðx; 0L ÞÞ ¼ SðNðNðyÞÞ;NðxÞÞ
¼ Sðy;NðxÞÞ
¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ
¼ IS;Nðx; yÞ
ðA:4Þ IS;Nðx;IS;Nðy; zÞÞ ¼SðNðxÞ;SðNðyÞ; zÞÞ
¼SðSðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞ; zÞ
¼SðSðNðyÞ;NðxÞÞ; zÞ
¼SðNðyÞ;SðNðxÞ; zÞÞ
¼ IS;Nðy;IS;Nðx; zÞÞ
The deduction for axiom (A.3) requires the involutivity ofN. h
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As the following theorem shows, t-representability presents us with an
important obstacle in our quest for a Łukasiewicz implicator on L.
Theorem 5. Axiom (A.5) fails for every t-representable S-implicator IS;N on L,
provided thatN is involutive.
Proof. Assume that the representants of S are S and T . By deﬁnition we have,
for x; y 2 L:
IS;Nðx; yÞ ¼ ðSðpr1NðxÞ; y1Þ; T ðpr2NðxÞ; y2ÞÞ
Let y ¼ ð0; y2Þ 2 L, x ¼ ð0; x2Þ 2 L such that 1 > x2P y2, so x6L y. Then
IS;Nðx; yÞ ¼ ðSðpr1NðxÞ; 0Þ; T ðpr2NðxÞ; y2ÞÞ
¼ ðpr1NðxÞ; T ðpr2NðxÞ; y2ÞÞ
If pr1NðxÞ ¼ 1 then pr2NðxÞ ¼ 0 and thus x ¼NðNðxÞÞ ¼Nð1L Þ ¼ 0L ,
which contradicts our assumptions about x. Hence pr1NðxÞ 6¼ 1, and thus
IS;Nðx; yÞ 6¼ 1L . h
Theorem 6. Axiom (A.6) holds for an S-implicator IS;N on L as soon asS and
N are continuous. In particular, a t-representable S-implicator represented by T
and S is continuous as soon as T , S andN are continuous.
Proof. This is obvious by the chaining rule for continuous mappings on the
subspace L of R2. h
4.2.2. R-implicators
Theorem 7. An R-implicator IT on L is a border implicator.
Proof. We only have to verify (A.2). Let x 2 L. We have:
supfc 2 LjTð1L ; cÞ6L xg ¼ supfc 2 Ljc6L xg ¼ x 
Again, problems emerge w.r.t. t-representability, this time concerning the
contrapositivity of the implicator.
Theorem 8. Axiom (A.3) does not hold for any t-representable R-implicator IT
on L.
Proof. Assume that the representants of T are T and S. Let x; y 2 L, and
suppose (A.3) holds. ThenNIT is involutive. We have:
ITðNITðyÞ;NITðxÞÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðNITðyÞ; cÞ6LNITðxÞg
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Let y ¼ 0L , thenNITðyÞ ¼ 1L and
ITð1L ;NITðxÞÞ ¼NITðxÞ
We also have ITðx; 0L Þ ¼NITðxÞ, in other words:
supfðc1; c2Þ 2 LjðTðx1; c1Þ; Sðx2; c2ÞÞ6L 0Lg ¼NITðxÞ
Let x ¼ ðx1; 0Þ 6¼ 1L , thenNITðxÞ 6¼ 0L sinceNIT is involutive. We ﬁnd:
ITðx; 0L Þ ¼ supfðc1; c2Þ 2 LjðT ðx1; c1Þ; c2Þ6L 0Lg ¼NITðxÞ
Since inffc2 2 ½0; 1jc2P 1g ¼ 1, we obtain
ITðx; 0L Þ ¼ 0L 6¼NITðxÞ
which is a contradiction. In other words, (A.3) does not hold. h
Theorem 9. Axiom (A.5) holds for the R-implicator IT if and only if there exists
for each x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ 2 L a sequence ðdiÞi2N in X ¼ fd 2 Ljd2 > 0g such that
limi!1 di ¼ 1L and,
lim
di!1L
pr1Tðx; diÞ ¼ x1 ð2Þ
lim
di!1L
pr2Tðx; diÞ ¼ x2 ð3Þ
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that conditions (2) and (3) are fulﬁlled. We start by proving
that
ð8ðx; yÞ 2 ðLÞ2Þðx6L y ) ITðx; yÞ ¼ 1L Þ
Let x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ, y ¼ ðy1; y2Þ 2 L such that x6L y, then 8c 2 L, Tðx; cÞ6L
x6L y. Hence
supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg ¼ 1L
To prove the converse implication,
8ðx; yÞ 2 ðLÞ2
 
ðx6L y ( ITðx; yÞ ¼ 1L Þ;
let x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ, y ¼ ðy1; y2Þ 2 L. From
ITðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg ¼ 1L
it follows that X  fc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg, and so pr1Tðx; diÞ6 y1 8i 2 N, so
limdi!1L pr1Tðx; diÞ ¼ x16 y1. Similarly we obtain limdi!1L pr2Tðx; diÞ ¼
x2P y2. Hence x6L y.
Conversely, assume that (A.5) holds. Suppose now that for each sequence
ðdiÞi2N in X converging to 1L , either limdi!1L pr1Tðx; diÞ is strictly smaller
than x1, or does not exist, or that limdi!1L pr2Tðx; diÞ is strictly greater than x2
or does not exist.
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Let now
y ¼ supfTðx; cÞjc 2 Xg;
then since Tðx; cÞ6L x for all c 2 L, y6L x. Suppose y ¼ x. Let then  ¼ 1n,
with n 2 N. Then, since x1 ¼ supfpr1Tðx; cÞjc 2 Xg, there exists a cn 2 X such
that x1   < pr1Tðx; cnÞ6 x1, thus jx1  pr1Tðx; cnÞj <  ¼ 1n. Similarly, there
exists a c0n 2 X such that jx2  pr2Tðx; c0nÞj < . Let now c00n ¼ supfcn; c0n; ð1
1
n ;
1
nÞg. Then c00nP Lcn, so pr1Tðx; c00nÞP pr1Tðx; cnÞ, and similarly
pr2Tðx; c00nÞ6pr2Tðx; c0nÞ. Furthermore c00n 2 X, since c00n;2 ¼ minfcn;2; c0n;2; 1ng > 0.
Thus we obtain a sequence ðc00nÞn2N in X such that jc00n;1  1j þ jc00n;2  0j6 2n andjpr1Tðx; c00nÞ  x1j þ jpr2Tðx; c00nÞ  x2j < 2n. Clearly limn!þ1 c00n ¼ 1L and
limn!þ1Tðx; c00nÞ ¼ x, which is in contradiction with our assumption. Hence
y <L x, so xiLy. Clearly
supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg ¼ 1L
In other words, (A.5) is violated, so our assumption that conditions (2) and (3)
do not hold was false. h
Corollary 10. If T is a t-norm on L such that pr1T is a left-continuous
ðLÞ2 ! ½0; 1 mapping and pr2T is a right-continuous ðLÞ2 ! ½0; 1 mapping
then IT satisfies (A.5).
Proof. We will prove this result by constructing a sequence meeting the con-
ditions of Theorem 9. From the left-continuity of pr1T and the right-conti-
nuity of pr2T follows for all x; y 2 L [29]:
ð8 > 0Þð9d1 > 0Þð9d2 > 0Þð8y 0 2 LÞðy1  d1 < y016 y1 and
y26 y02 < y2 þ d2 ) jpr1Tðx; yÞ  pr1Tðx; y0Þj þ jpr2Tðx; yÞ
 pr2Tðx; y0Þj < Þ
In [29] this property is proven to be equivalent to
Tðx; supAÞ ¼ sup
y2A
Tðx; yÞ
for any x 2 L and any subset A of L. So let arbitrarily x 2 L. Then we obtain
supc2XTðx; cÞ ¼Tðx; supXÞ, i.e. supfTðx; cÞjc 2 Xg ¼Tðx; 1L Þ ¼ x, where
X ¼ fd 2 Ljd2 > 0g. Similarly as in Theorem 9 a sequence can be constructed
which satisﬁes the desired properties. h
To convince the reader that t-representability really does impose an unac-
ceptable restriction on an implicator on L, we now prove that ITW ¼ ISW ;Ns ,
i.e. the implicator derived in Examples 4 and 7, satisﬁes all Smets–Magrez
axioms, showing at the same time that a Łukasiewicz implicator on L can be
both an S- and an R-implicator.
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Theorem 11. ISW ;Ns is a Łukasiewicz implicator.
Proof. ISW ;Ns satisﬁes (A.1)–(A.4) because it is an S-implicator on L
 andNs
is involutive. SinceSW andNs are continuous, so is ISW ;Ns . Only (A.5) is left
to verify. Recall the deﬁnition of ISW ;Ns , i.e. for all x; y 2 L:
ISW ;Nsðx; yÞ ¼ ðminð1; y1 þ 1 x1; x2 þ 1 y2Þ;maxð0; y2 þ x1  1ÞÞ
We ﬁnd: y1 þ 1 x1 < 1 iﬀ y1 < x1, x2 þ 1 y2 < 1 iﬀ x2 < y2. Hence
minð1; x2 þ 1 y2; y1 þ 1 x1Þ < 1 iﬀ either y1 < x1 or x2 < y2. So minð1; x2þ
1 y2; y1 þ 1 x1Þ ¼ 1 iﬀ y1P x1 and x2P y2, i.e. iﬀ x6L y. h
In Table 1, we have summarized the classiﬁcation results w.r.t. the extended
Smets–Magrez axioms. For completeness, apart from S- and R-implicators, we
have also included the implicators discussed in Section 3.3. It is left to the
reader to verify these properties.
A question unanswered by this table is whether there exist Łukasiewicz
implicators on L outside the classes of S- and R-implicators. This and other
issues are resolved in the following paragraph.
4.3. Representation of model and Łukasiewicz implicators on L
We have shown, by explicit example, that a Łukasiewicz implicator on L
exists. The next question to ask is whether we can capture all of them by a
parameterized formula, as was done for implicators on ½0; 1 (see e.g. [46]). The
answer turns out to be largely aﬃrmative, as the following discussion reveals.
Table 1
Smets–Magrez axioms for a number of implicators and implicator classes on L
(A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (A.5) (A.6)
S-implicators yes yes providedN
involutive
yes e.g. ITW provided
S andN
continuous
t-representable
S-implicators
yes yes providedN
involutive
yes no provided
S, T andN
continuous
R-implicators yes yes e.g. ITW e.g. ITW Theorem 9 e.g. ITW
t-representable
R-implicators
yes yes no unknown e.g.
Example 5
unknown
Iag yes yes no yes no no
Ig yes yes no yes yes no
IB yes no yes yes no yes
Iwu yes no no no yes no
J no no no no yes no
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A ﬁrst important subresult in this direction is the observation that each
model implicator on L has a representation as an S-implicator.
Lemma 1 (Triangular norm and conorm induced by a model implicator). If
I is a model implicator, then the ðLÞ2 ! L-mappings TI and SI defined by,
for x; y 2 L,
TIðx; yÞ ¼NIðIðx;NIðyÞÞÞ
SIðx; yÞ ¼ IðNIðxÞ; yÞ
are a t-norm and an t-conorm on L, respectively. They are called the t-norm and
t-conorm induced by I.
Proof. We prove the claim for TI. The proof for SI is analogous.
• TI is increasing. This is obvious because I is an implicator andN a nega-
tor on L.
• TI is commutative. Indeed, for x; y 2 L, we have:
TIðx; yÞ ¼NIðIðx;NIðyÞÞÞ Definition TI
¼NIðIðNIðNIðyÞÞ;NIðxÞÞÞ I contrapositive w:r:t: NI
¼NIðIðy;NIðxÞÞÞ NI is involutive
¼TIðy; xÞ Definition TI
• TI is associative. Indeed, for x; y; z 2 L, we have:
TIðx;TIðy; zÞÞ
¼NIðIðx;NIðNIðIðy;NIðzÞÞÞÞÞÞ Definition TI
¼NIðIðx;Iðy;NIðzÞÞÞÞ NI is involutive
¼NIðIðx;IðNIðNIðzÞÞ;NIðyÞÞÞÞ I is contrapositive w:r:t:NI
¼NIðIðx;Iðz;NIðyÞÞÞÞ NI is involutive
¼NIðIðz;Iðx;NIðyÞÞÞÞ I satisfies ðA:4Þ
¼NIðIðNIðIðx;NIðyÞÞÞ;NIðzÞÞÞ I is contrapositive w:r:t:NI
¼TIðTIðx; yÞ; zÞ Definition TI
• TIð1L ; xÞ ¼ x. Indeed, for x; y 2 L, we have:
TIð1L ; xÞ ¼NIðIð1L ;NIðxÞÞÞ Definition TI
¼NIðNIðxÞÞ I satisfies ðA:2Þ
¼ x NI is involutive 
Deﬁnition 10 (IF de Morgan triplet). An IF de Morgan triplet is any triplet
ðT;S;NÞ consisting of a t-norm T, a t-conorm S and a negator N on L
such that, for all x; y 2 L:
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NðTðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ ¼Sðx; yÞ
NðSðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ ¼Tðx; yÞ
Lemma 2. If I is a model implicator on L, then ðTI;SI;NIÞ is an IF de
Morgan triplet.
Proof. We have to prove thatTI andSI are dual w.r.tNI. For x; y 2 L, we
have:
 NIðTIðNIðxÞ;NIðyÞÞÞ
¼NIðNIðIðNIðxÞ;NIðNIðyÞÞÞÞÞ Definition TI
¼ IðNIðxÞ; yÞ NI is involutive
¼SIðx; yÞ Definition SI
 NIðSIðNIðxÞ;NIðyÞÞÞ
¼NIðIðNIðNIðxÞÞ;NIðyÞÞÞ Definition SI
¼NIðIðx;NIðyÞÞÞ NI is involutive
¼TIðx; yÞ Definition TI 
Deﬁnition 11 (IF de Morgan quartet). An IF de Morgan quartet is any quartet
ðT;S;N;IÞ consisting of a t-norm T, a t-conorm S, a negator N and
an implicator I on L such that ðT;S;NÞ is an IF de Morgan triplet and, for
all x; y 2 L:
Iðx; yÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ
Theorem 12. If I is a model implicator on L, then ðTI;SI;NI;IÞ is an IF de
Morgan quartet.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that ðTI;SI;NIÞ is an IF de Morgan
triplet. Furthermore, for all x; y 2 L we ﬁnd:
SIðNIðxÞ; yÞ ¼ IðNIðNIðxÞÞ; yÞ DefinitionSI
¼ Iðx; yÞ NI is involutive 
Corollary 13. A model implicator on L is an S-implicator.
Proof. Indeed, from Theorem 12 we know that for a model implicator I,
ðTI;SI;NI;IÞ is a de Morgan quartet. Choose S ¼ SI and N ¼NI,
then I ¼ IS;N. h
This, and the results from the previous subsection, conﬁrm that our search for
Łukasiewicz implicators on L is limited to non-t-representable S-implicators.
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We now proceed to establish a link between Łukasiewicz implicators
on L and R-implicators generated by t-norms satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 3. To this aim, a number of lemmas are introduced.
Theorem 14. Let T be a t-norm on L satisfying the residuation principle. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
ii(i) IT satisfies (A.3)
i(ii) ITðx; yÞ ¼NðTðx;NðyÞÞÞ for all x; y 2 L
(iii) Tðx; yÞ6L z()Tðx;NðzÞÞ6LNðyÞ for all x; y; z 2 L (exchange
principle)
whereN ¼NIT . Moreover, ifT satisfies (iii), thenT satisfies the residuation
principle.
Proof. We will prove that (iii)) (ii)) (i)) (iii). First note that since IT
satisﬁes (A.2) and (A.3),NIT is involutive.
• Assume (iii) holds. The following deduction, for all x; y; z 2 L, shows that
(ii) holds.
ITðx; yÞ ¼ supfc 2 LjTðx; cÞ6L yg
¼ supfc 2 LjTðx;NðyÞÞ6LNðcÞg
¼ supfc 2 Ljc6LNðTðx;NðyÞÞÞg
¼NðTðx;NðyÞÞÞ
• Assume next that (ii) holds, then for all x; y; z 2 L, we have:
ITðNðyÞ;NðxÞÞ ¼NðTðNðyÞ;NðNðxÞÞÞÞ
¼NðTðNðyÞ; xÞÞ
¼NðTðx;NðyÞÞÞ
¼ ITðx; yÞ
• Lastly, assume IT is contrapositive; we prove (iii). Since IT satisﬁes the
residuation principle, we obtain successively, for all x; y; z 2 L:
Tðx; yÞ6L z()Tðy; xÞ6L z
() x6L ITðy; zÞ
() x6L ITðNðzÞ;NðyÞÞ
()TðNðzÞ; xÞ6LNðyÞ
()Tðx;NðzÞÞ6LNðyÞ
Since from (iii) follows (ii), and using the fact that N is involutive and de-
creasing, we obtain successively:
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Tðx; zÞ6L y ()Tðx;NðyÞÞ6LNðzÞ
() z6LNðTðx;NyÞÞ
() z6L ITðx; yÞ
Hence from (iii) follows the residuation principle. h
Lemma 3. Let T be a t-norm on L satisfying the exchange principle. Then
Tðx; yÞ ¼ 0L () x6LNITðyÞ () y6LNITðxÞ.
Proof. From the exchange principle follows Tðx; yÞ ¼ 0L () x ¼Tðx;
1L Þ6LNITðyÞ. h
Lemma 4 [29]. LetT be a t-norm on L satisfying the residuation principle. Then,
for any x; y; z such thatTðx; yÞ ¼ z, there exists an y 0 2 L such that y0PLy and
Tðx; y 0Þ ¼ z and y0 ¼ ITðx; zÞ: ð4Þ
Lemma 5. Let T be a continuous t-norm on L satisfying TðD;DÞ  D and the
exchange principle. Then T also satisfies the archimedean property, strong nil-
potency, ITðD;DÞ  D and Tðð0; 0Þ; ð0; 0ÞÞ ¼ 0L .
Proof
• Tðð0; 0Þ; ð0; 0Þ ¼ 0L .
Since NIT is an involutive negator, we have that NITð0; 0Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ (see
[29]). Hence ITðð0; 0Þ; 0L Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ and from the residuation principle and
Theorem 14 follows that Tðð0; 0Þ; ð0; 0ÞÞ ¼ 0L .
• T is archimedean.
Assume x 2 L n f0L ; 1Lg and Tðx; xÞ ¼ x. Then, since T is increasing
and Tðx; 1L Þ ¼ x, we obtain Tðx; yÞ ¼ x for all yP Lx. In particular
Tðx; ðx1; 0ÞÞ ¼ x.
If x1 ¼ 0, then Tðð0; x2Þ; ð0; x2ÞÞ6LTðð0; 0Þ; ð0; 0ÞÞ ¼ 0L <L ð0; x2Þ. Sup-
pose now x1 > 0. We prove that there exists a sequence ðynÞn2N which con-
verges to ðx1; 0Þ and such that, for all n 2 N, yn ¼ ðyn;1; 0Þ and yn satisﬁes
Tðx;NITðznÞÞ ¼NITðynÞ;where zn ¼Tðx; ynÞ ð5Þ
Let n 2 N. Since Tðx; yÞ6L y for all y 2 L, we obtain pr1Tðx; ðx1
1
n ; 0ÞÞ6 x1  1n < x1. Since T is increasing, we have Tðx; ðx1  1n ; 0ÞÞ6L
Tðx; 1L Þ ¼ x, so pr2Tðx; ðx1  1n ; 0ÞÞP x2. Hence we obtain Tðx; ðx1
1
n ; 0ÞÞ <L x. From Lemma 4 and Theorem 14 it follows that there exists a yn
such that Tðx; ynÞ ¼Tðx; ðx1  1n ; 0ÞÞ and yn satisﬁes (5). Furthermore, from
that lemma follows that ynP L ðx1  1n ; 0Þ, so x1  1n 6 yn;1 and yn;2 ¼ 0. Since
Tðx; ynÞ <L x, it follows that ynjLx, thus yn;1 < x1 (since yn;2 ¼ 06 x2). From
this follows that jx1  yn;1j þ j0 yn;2j ¼ x1  yn;16 x1  ðx1  1nÞ ¼ 1n; hence
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limn!þ1 yn ¼ ðx1; 0Þ. Moreover, since T is continuous, we have limn!þ1 zn ¼
limn!þ1Tðx; ynÞ ¼Tðx; ðx1; 0ÞÞ ¼ x. From the involutivity (and hence
the continuity) of N follows that limn!þ1NITðznÞ ¼ NITðxÞ, and
limn!þ1NITðynÞ ¼NITðx1; 0Þ. Since yn satisﬁes (5), we obtainNITðx1;0Þ ¼
limn!þ1NðynÞ ¼ limn!þ1Tðx;NITðznÞÞ ¼Tðx;NITðxÞÞ ¼ 0L , using the
continuity ofT and Lemma 3. Hence ðx1; 0Þ ¼ 1L , which is a contradiction to
our assumption that x 6¼ 1L .
• T is strong nilpotent.
From Lemma 3 follows Tðx; yÞ ¼ 0L () x6LNðyÞ. So let x 2 Dn
f0L ; 1Lg, thenNðxÞ 2 D n f0L ; 1Lg (cf. [29]) andTðx;NðxÞÞ ¼ 0L . HenceT
is strong nilpotent.
• ITðD;DÞ  D.
By Theorem 14, ITðx; yÞ ¼NITðTðx;NðyÞÞ for all x; y 2 L. By Theorem
1, there exists an involutive negator N on ½0; 1 such that NITðxÞ ¼
ðNð1 x2Þ; 1 Nðx1ÞÞ for all x 2 L. Particularly, if x 2 D, then NITðxÞ ¼
ðNðx1Þ; 1 Nðx1ÞÞ. Hence NITðxÞ 2 D. Since TðD;DÞ  D, it follows that
ITðD;DÞ  D. h
Theorem 15. Let T be a continuous t-norm on L satisfying the residuation
principle and TðD;DÞ  D. IT is contrapositive if and only if there exists a
continuous increasing permutation U of L such that U1 is increasing and such
that T ¼ U1 TW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ. If such a U exists then IT ¼ U1 
ITW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ.
Proof. LetT be a continuous t-norm on L satisfying the residuation principle
andTðD;DÞ  D. IfIT is contrapositive, then, by Theorem 14,T satisﬁes the
exchange principle. By Lemma 3 and Theorem 3, T ¼ U1 TW  ðU  pr1;
U  pr2Þ.
We obtain, for c 2 L,
Tðx; cÞ6L y () U1ðTW ðUðxÞ;UðcÞÞÞ6L y
()TW ðUðxÞ;UðcÞÞ6L UðyÞ
() UðcÞ6L ITW ðUðxÞ;UðyÞÞ
() c6L U1ðITW ðUðxÞ;UðyÞÞÞ
where we used the fact that TW satisﬁes the residuation principle, and that U
and U1 are increasing permutations. We easily obtain that ITW ðx; yÞ ¼
supfc2 Ljc6LU1ðITW ðUðxÞ;UðyÞÞÞg ¼U1ðITW ðUðxÞ;UðyÞÞÞ. Hence IT ¼
U1 ITW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ.
On the other hand, suppose T ¼ U1 TW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ. IT can
only be contrapositive w.r.t. its induced negator N ¼NIT , deﬁned by
NITðxÞ ¼ ITðx; 0L Þ for all x 2 L. Then
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NðxÞ ¼ U1ðITW ðUðxÞ;Uð0L ÞÞÞ
¼ U1ðITW ðUðxÞ; 0L ÞÞ
¼ U1ðNsðUðxÞÞÞ
where we usedNITW ¼Ns. Hence we obtain
ITðNðyÞ;NðxÞÞ ¼ U1ðITW ðUðNðyÞÞ;UðNðxÞÞÞÞ
¼ U1ðITW ðNsðUðyÞÞ;NsðUðxÞÞÞÞ
¼ U1ðITW ðUðxÞ;UðyÞÞÞ ¼ ITðx; yÞ
using the fact that ITW is contrapositive w.r.t.Ns. h
Theorem 16. If I is a Łukasiewicz implicator on L such that IðD;DÞ  D, then
there exists a continuous increasing permutation U of L such that U1 is in-
creasing and
Iðx; yÞ ¼ U1 ITW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ
Proof. Since any model implicator on L is an S-implicator, we know that
I ¼ IS;N for some t-conorm S on L and the involutive negatorN ¼NI.
Since I satisﬁes (A.5), x6L y ()SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ 1L , or equivalently
NðxÞ6L y ()Sðx; yÞ ¼ 1L . Since S is associative, it holds that
Sðx;Sðy; zÞÞ ¼ 1L ()Sðy;Sðx; zÞÞ ¼ 1L , hence NðxÞ6LSðy; zÞ ()
NðyÞ6LSðx; zÞ. By changing the variable names as z! x, y ! y and
x!NðzÞ, we obtain
z6LSðx; yÞ ()NðyÞ6LSðx;NðzÞÞ ð6Þ
Let T be the dual t-norm of S w.r.t. N, i.e. Tðx; yÞ ¼NðSðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ
for all x; y 2 L. Then (6) is equivalent to z6LNðTðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ ()
NðyÞ6LNðTðNðxÞ; zÞÞ. Since N is involutive and decreasing, this yields
NðzÞPLTðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞ () yPLTðNðxÞ; zÞ. By substituting the variable
names as x!NðxÞ, y !NðyÞ and z!NðzÞ, we obtain
Tðx; yÞ6L z()Tðx;NðzÞÞ6LNðyÞ ð7Þ
From Theorem 14 follows that the R-implicator IT generated by T
satisﬁes ITðx; yÞ ¼NðTðx;NðyÞÞÞ for all x; y 2 L. Hence ITðx; yÞ ¼
NðTðx;NðyÞÞÞ ¼ NðTðNðNðxÞÞ;NðyÞÞÞ ¼ SðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ IS;Nðx; yÞ ¼
Iðx; yÞ for all x; y 2 L. Since I andN are continuous, so are S and T.
Since IðD;DÞ  D and NðDÞ  D for all x; y 2 D it holds that
Sðx; yÞ ¼ IS;NðNðxÞ; yÞ ¼ IðNðxÞ; yÞ 2 D. So we obtain that for all x; y 2 D
it holds that Tðx; yÞ ¼NðSðNðxÞ;NðyÞÞÞ 2 D, i.e. TðD;DÞ  D. From
Theorems 14 and 15 follows that there exists a continous increasing permutation
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U of L such that U1 is increasing and such that I ¼ U1 
ITW  ðU  pr1;U  pr2Þ. h
In [29] it is shown that if U is a continuous, increasing permutation of L
such that U1 is also increasing, then there exists a continuous, increasing
permutation u of ½0; 1 such that UðxÞ ¼ ðuðx1Þ; 1 uð1 x2ÞÞ for all x 2 L. It
follows that ifI is a Łukasiewicz implicator on L such that IðD;DÞ  D, then
there exists an increasing permutation u of L such that, for all x; y 2 L,
Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ  uðx1Þ; 1þ uð1 y2Þ
 uð1 x2ÞÞ; 1 u1 minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ uð1 y2ÞÞÞ
Theorem 17. Let I be the implicator on L defined by, for all x; y 2 L,
Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ  uðx1Þ; 1þ uð1 y2Þ
 uð1 x2ÞÞ; 1 u1 minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ uð1 y2ÞÞÞ
Then I is a Łukasiewicz implicator.
Proof. We have Ið0L ; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1;1þuðy1Þ;1þuð1 y2ÞÞ;1u1
minð1;1þuð1 y2ÞÞÞ ¼ 1L , Iðx;1L Þ ¼ ðu1 minð1;1þ 1uðx1Þ;1þ 1uð1
x2ÞÞ, 1 u1 minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ 1ÞÞ ¼ 1L for all x; y 2 L. Also, Ið1L ; 0L Þ ¼
0L . Clearly, I is decreasing in its ﬁrst and increasing in its second component,
since u and u1 are increasing. Hence I is an implicator on L.
Now Ið1L ; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ  1; 1þ uð1 y2Þ  1Þ, 1 u1
minð1; 1 1þ uð1 y2ÞÞÞ ¼ ðy1; y2Þ ¼ y. Hence (A.2) is veriﬁed.
For all x 2 L we have NðxÞ ¼ Iðx; 0L Þ ¼ ðu1 minð1 uðx1Þ; 1 uð1
x2ÞÞ; 1u1ð1 uðx1ÞÞÞ ¼ ðu1ð1 uð1 x2ÞÞ; 1 u1ð1 uðx1ÞÞÞ, using the
fact that x16 1 x2 and u is increasing. We obtain IðNðyÞ;NðxÞÞ ¼
ðu1minð1;1þ1uð1 x2Þ1þuð1 y2Þ;1þ1uðx1Þ1þuðy1ÞÞ;1u1
minð1;11þuð1 y2Þþ1uðx1ÞÞÞ¼Iðx;yÞ. Hence (A.3) holds.
We have Iðx;Iðy; zÞÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðu1 minð1; 1þ uðz1Þ  uðy1Þ; 1þ
uð1 z2Þuð1 y2ÞÞÞuðx1Þ;1þuð11þu1minð1;1uðy1Þþuð1 z2ÞÞÞ
uð1  x2ÞÞ; 1  u1 minð1; 1  uðx1Þ þ uð1  1 þ u1 minð1; 1  uðy1Þ þ uð1
z2ÞÞÞÞÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1 þ 1 þ uðz1Þ  uðy1Þ  uðx1Þ; 1 þ 1 þ uð1  z2Þ  uð1
y2Þ  uðx1Þ; 1 þ 1  uðy1Þ þ uð1  z2Þ  uð1  x2ÞÞ; 1  u1 minð1; 1  uðx1Þþ
1 uðy1Þ þ uð1 z2ÞÞÞ, which is symmetrical in x and y and thus equal to
Iðy;Iðx; zÞÞ. So (A.4) holds.
Furthermore, Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ  uðx1Þ; 1þuð1 y2Þ  uð1
x2ÞÞ; 1u1 minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ uð1 y2ÞÞÞ ¼ 1L () minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ uðx1Þ;
1þ uð1 y2Þ  uð1 x2ÞÞ ¼ 1 and minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ uð1 y2ÞÞ ¼ 1()
uðy1ÞPuðx1Þ and uð1 y2ÞPuð1 x2Þ and uð1 y2ÞPuðx1Þ () y1P x1
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and 1 y2P 1 x2 and 1 y2P x1 () y1P x1 and y26 x2 () x6L y using
the fact that u is an increasing permutation. Hence I satisﬁes (A.5).
Since u is a continuous increasing permutation of ½0; 1, u1 is also con-
tinuous. It follows easily that I is continuous and hence satisﬁes (A.6). h
The following theorem summarizes the results of this subsection:
Theorem 18. An ðLÞ2 ! L mapping I is a Łukasiewicz implicator satisfying
IðD;DÞ  D if and only if, for all x; y 2 L
Iðx; yÞ ¼ ðu1 minð1; 1þ uðy1Þ  uðx1Þ; 1þ uð1 y2Þ  uð1 x2ÞÞ;
1 u1 minð1; 1 uðx1Þ þ uð1 y2ÞÞÞ
Open problem. Does there exist a Łukasiewicz implicator such that
IðD;DÞ*D?
Note. We wish to stress that the axioms imposed by Smets and Magrez are
by no means the only interesting ones for implicators. For instance, Gargov
and Atanassov [3] enforced the following distributivity condition on I:
ð8x; y; z 2 LÞðIðx;Iðy; zÞÞ ¼ IðIðx; yÞ;Iðx; zÞÞÞ ð8Þ
Łukasiewicz implicators do not satisfy it, while Iag from Example 4 does. So if
(8) is needed, Iag is obviously a better option, yet one should realize that it is
not contrapositive.
5. Links with residuated lattices and MV-algebras
It is well-known that classical logic can be described by a boolean algebra.
In order to have more than two values for the evaluation of formulas, there
have been many attempts to generalize this traditional structure. In this con-
text, residuated lattices and MV-algebras take a particularly distinguished role
(see e.g. [38,52,53,62]). The aim of this paragraph is to embed the classiﬁcation
results established above into these general algebraic frameworks for logical
calculi.
Deﬁnition 12 (Residuated lattice). An algebraic structure L ¼ ðL;^;_;	;!;
0; 1Þ is called a residuated lattice provided
• ðL;^;_Þ is a bounded lattice with ordering 6 L and 0 and 1 as its smallest
and greatest element, respectively;
• 	 is a monotonous, commutative, associative L2 ! L mapping;
• ! is another L2 ! L mapping such that for all x; y; z 2 L holds:
x	 y 6Lz() x 6L y ! z
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From this deﬁnition and our previous discussion, it is obvious that
ðL;Min;Max;T;IT; 0L ; 1L Þ is a residuated lattice if and only if T is a tri-
angular norm on L that satisﬁes the residuation principle. As a noteworthy
example, Łukasiewicz implicators I such that IðD;DÞ  D (which are always
R-implicators generated by a t-norm T satisfying the residuation principle,
cf. Theorem 16) can be used to construct instances of residuated lattices.
We denote them by LI.
H€ohle introduced the concept of a square root [39] function of a residuated
lattice. Concretely, given the residuated lattice L ¼ ðL;^;_;	;!; 0; 1Þ, an
L! L mapping ﬃﬃﬃp is called square root function of L if for every x; y 2 L
the following conditions hold:
S1
ﬃﬃ
x
p 	 ﬃﬃxp ¼ x
S2 y 	 y 6L x) y6 L
ﬃﬃ
x
p
For the residuated lattice ð½0; 1;min;max; TW ; Ia; 0; 1Þ a square root function
exists [52]. It is therefore worthwhile to examine whether this operation is still
deﬁnable for its extension, the residuated lattice LITW . The answer turns out
to be negative.
Example 12. Assume the square root function of LITW exists. Then for all
x 2 L there exists an x0 2 L such that
TW ðx0; x0Þ ¼ ðmaxð0; 2x01  1Þ;minð1; x02 þ 1 x01ÞÞ ¼ x
Let x ¼ ð0:1; 0:1Þ, then TW ðx0; x0Þ ¼ x if and only if 2x01  1 ¼ 0:1 and
x02 þ 1 x01 ¼ 0:1, i.e. if x01 ¼ 0:55 and x02 ¼ 0:1 1þ x01 ¼ 0:35, so x0 62 L.
We conclude that no square root function for LITW exists.
In [10], Chang deﬁned a stronger version of a residuated lattice called an
MV-algebra. We will not reproduce Changs original, lengthy deﬁnition here,
but instead deﬁne the notion by a characterization in terms of residuated lat-
tices [52].
Deﬁnition 13 (MV-algebra). An MV-algebra is a residuated lattice ðL;^;
_;	;!; 0; 1Þ such that the following condition is fulﬁlled, for all x; y 2 L:
ðx! yÞ ! y ¼ x _ y
Again the question arises whether the extension LITW of (½0; 1,min,
max,TW ,Ia,0,1) inherits the property of being an MV-algebra. A simple coun-
terexample shows that it does not. Indeed, let x ¼ 1
9
; 1
5
 
and y ¼ 2
3
; 1
4
 
. Then
ITW ðITW ðx; yÞ; yÞ ¼ 4360 ; 15
 
, while Maxðx; yÞ ¼ 2
3
; 1
5
 
. So, whereas the Smets–
Magrez axioms can be maintained under the extension to L, the property of
being an MV-algebra is lost. A stronger result can be proven using H€ohles
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claim [40] that an inﬁnite, locally ﬁnite, 6 complete 7 MV-algebra is necessarily
isomorphic with (½0; 1,min,max,TW ,Ia,0,1):
Theorem 19. If L ¼ ðL;Min;Max;T;IT; 0L ; 1L Þ is locally finite, and T is
continuous, then L is no MV-algebra.
Proof. If L is an MV-algebra, then IT must be contrapositive [52]. From
Theorem 14, we derive that T satisﬁes the exchange principle, and thus by
Lemma 7 and the continuity of T, T is archimedean. Since no isomorphism
exists between ½0; 1 and L, the proof is complete providedL is locally ﬁnite. h
6. Intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued implicators: applications, opportunities,
challenges
During the past two decades, fuzzy implicators have played an increasingly
prominent role within the research focused on fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. Fuzzy
implicators have been shown useful in rule-based (expert) systems, for deﬁning
inclusion measures and measures of guaranteed possibility and necessity, for
characterizing fuzzy rough sets and linguistic modiﬁers, for pattern classiﬁca-
tion, aggregation, preference modelling and decision making, fuzzy logic
programming and many other ﬁelds.
Our goal in these pages is not to go into the details of generalizing all or even
any of these application domains; let it suﬃce to mention that a lot of work in
that direction has already been done in both the interval computations (see e.g.
[11,12,37,43,44,47,51]) and intuitionistic fuzzy set theory communities (see e.g.
[4,7,8,20,21,50,56]). Rather we aim to provide some basic insight of (a) the
usefulness and (b) the ﬂexibility of calculation obtained by our lattice-valued
approach to implicators, and to outline some challenges and opportunities that
future research in this area could face. As a running example throughout this
section, we take the well-known generalized modus ponens (GMP) inference
rule [12,24,17], which reads:
IF X is A, THEN Y is B (1)
X is A0 (2)
Y is B0 (3)
6 An MV-algebra ðL;^;_;	;!; 0; 1Þ is called locally ﬁnite if to every x 2 L n f1g, there exists an
n 2 N such that
xn ¼ x	 x	 
 
 
 	 x|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ntimes
¼ 0
7 An MV-algebra with evaluation set L is called complete if L is complete.
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X and Y are assumed to be variables in the respective universes U and V . A
and A0 are mappings from U to L (elements of FL ðUÞ), while B and B0 are
mappings from V to L (elements of FL ðV Þ), and all of them can be inter-
preted as interval-valued or intuitionistic fuzzy sets. Generally, they are as-
sumed to be normalized: an L-fuzzy set A in U is called normalized if there
exists at least one u 2 U such that AðuÞ ¼ 1L . The statements (1) and (2) above
the line are called the if-then rule and the observation on X , respectively, while
the statement (3) below the line is called the inference on Y . The above scheme
does not state what the fuzzy restriction B0 should be when A;A0 and B are
given. From all the possible alternatives, we consider here only the single best-
known one, i.e. the implementation by the compositional rule of inference
(CRI). This rule is a rigorous tool from relational calculus (see e.g. [15]) that
joins the if–then rule and the observation and projects the result onto the
universe of Y . Using the notation of [17], if T is a t-norm on L, I an im-
plicator on L and IðA;BÞ is the mapping from U  V to L deﬁned by, for
all ðu; vÞ 2 U  V
IðA;BÞðu; vÞ ¼ IðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞ
then we deﬁne the operator (actually a mapping from FL ðX Þ to FL ðY Þ)
criTIðA;BÞ for all v 2 V by
criTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞ ¼ sup
u2U
TðA0ðuÞ;IðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞÞ
Note how smoothly the extension of the GMP and the CRI 8 is obtained.
Again, this is due to the nature of L-fuzzy sets (and, more generally, arbitrary
L-fuzzy sets) that allow all of the order-theoretic notions such as conjunction,
composition, . . .to be straightforwardly deﬁned on them.
As a ﬁrst simple consistency test for the procedure deﬁned above, we in-
vestigate under which conditions it extends the classical modus ponens, that is:
if A0 ¼ A, then B0 ¼ B.
Theorem 20. If T is a t-norm on L satisfying the residuation principle, then
criTITðA;BÞðAÞ ¼ B for all normalized L-fuzzy sets A and B.
Proof. In [29] the following claim was proven: a t-norm T on L satisﬁes the
residuation principle if and only if
sup
z2Z
Tðx; zÞ ¼Tðx; sup
z2Z
zÞ ð9Þ
for any x 2 L and any subset Z of L. This allows for the following deduction,
for u 2 U and v 2 V :
8 In general, IðA;BÞ can be replaced by any U  V ! L mapping R.
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TðAðuÞ;ITðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞÞ ¼TðAðuÞ; supfc 2 LjTðAðuÞ; cÞ6L BðvÞgÞ
¼ supfTðAðuÞ; cÞjc 2 L andTðAðuÞ; cÞ
6L BðvÞg6L BðvÞ
On the other hand, since A is normalized, there exists u 2 U such that
AðuÞ ¼ 1L , so TðAðuÞ;ITðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞÞ ¼Tð1L ;ITð1L ;BðvÞÞ ¼ BðvÞ since
T is a t-norm and IT is a border implicator. Hence, for all v 2 V ,
criTITðA;BÞðAÞðvÞ ¼ BðvÞ 
Note. It is important to mark the diﬀerence with the analogous situation in
fuzzy set theory, where left-continuity of a t-norm T on ½0; 1 suﬃced to extend
the modus ponens if the associated R-implicator was used. In [29], however, a
continuous t-norm on L was constructed that does not satisfy equality (9).
In the next two subsections, we will come back to the GMP example to il-
lustrate the incorporation of uncertainty by means of IFSs and IVFSs into
knowledge-manipulating processes.
6.1. Propagation of uncertainty in L-fuzzy sets
It has been mentioned in the introduction that fuzzy sets are unable to deal
adequately with uncertainty. In this light, a degree of non-determinacy p was
introduced. In this paragraph, we will treat p as a mapping from L to ½0; 1
deﬁned by, for x 2 L, pðxÞ ¼ 1 x1  x2. For values x in D, obviously
pðxÞ ¼ 0.
The mapping p has the interesting feature that it allows us to focus exclu-
sively on uncertainty: controlling the propagation of uncertainty in the GMP
example will be tantamount to controlling the values pðxÞ for the membership
degrees x to the result L-fuzzy set B0. In this sense, we lend a willing ear to the
constraints imposed on the implicator I by Bustince et al. in [9], for x; y 2 L:
B:1 pðIðx; yÞÞ6 maxð1 x1; 1 y1Þ
B:2 x ¼ y ) pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ pðxÞ
B:3 pðxÞ ¼ pðyÞ ) pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ pðxÞ
The ﬁrst constraint is aimed at establishing upper bounds for the uncertainty
caused by an application of an implicator. The following easy deduction shows
that criterion (B.1) is satisﬁed by all Łukasiewicz implicators, and more gen-
erally by all S-implicators IS;N on L generated by arbitrary involutiveN and
S, by a very comfortable margin:
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pðIðx; yÞÞ ¼ 1 pr1ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ  pr2ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ
6 1 pr1ðSðNðxÞ; yÞÞ ¼ 1 pr1ðSððNð1 x2Þ; 1 Nðx1ÞÞ; yÞÞ
6 1maxðNð1 x2Þ; y1Þ ¼ minð1 Nð1 x2Þ; 1 y1Þ
6 maxð1 x1; 1 y1Þ
where we used the representation Theorem 1 for N by the fuzzy negator N .
Obviously, the one but last line of the above deduction oﬀers a tighter criterion
that we propose to replace the right hand side of (B.1) with; it will be hard to
prove compliance with stronger restrictions since lower bounds on Is second
projection are diﬃcult to obtain in general.
The remaining conditions address another issue, namely the conservation of
uncertainty through the application of an implicator on L. Despite their
fairness from an intuitive perspective, they conﬂict with the requirement im-
posed by logic that Iðx; xÞ ¼ 1L for x 2 L, an immediate consequence of
axiom (A.5); Łukasiewicz implicators therefore never satisfy (B.2) nor (B.3);
the implicator from Example 2 on the other hand does.
The above observation appears to point out an intuitive anomaly, namely
that uncertainty can disappear entirely through the application of an implicator
on L. Although this important debate on the apparent clash between logical
and cognitive assumptions needs to be pursued further and in full depth, our
feeling is that a decision to comply with (B.2) and/or (B.3) should depend
primarily on the application at hand, and so the conditions are not absolute.
For instance, in determining the degree of inclusion of fuzzy sets into one
another, sometimes the formula [26]
IncðA;BÞ ¼ inf
u2U
IðAðuÞ;BðuÞÞ
is used, where A and B are fuzzy sets in U and I is an implicator on ½0; 1.
Suppose we replace I by an implicator I on L and generalize A;B to arbitrary
L-fuzzy sets. Naturally, IncðA;BÞ should be equal to 1 if and only if A  B,
that is ð8u 2 UÞðAðuÞ6L BðuÞÞ. Hence I should satisfy (A.5). This material is
studied in detail in [25].
In the GMP example, there do not seem to be any arguments in favour of
(B.2) and (B.3) either. A more relevant criterion is the following:
ð8v 2 V ÞðpðcriTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞÞP pðBðvÞÞÞ
In other words, unreliable observations do not give way to strictly more reli-
able conclusions, or equivalently uncertainty does not vanish. It can be
equivalently stated as:
pr1ðcriTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞÞ þ pr2ðcriTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞÞP pr1ðBðvÞÞ þ pr2ðBðvÞÞ
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Unfortunately, with the current machinery of Łukasiewicz implicators, the
latter inequality seems very diﬃcult to realize. The main problem is that there is
no direct correlation between p and the ordering in L, so that even when
x6L y, all three options: pðxÞ ¼ pðyÞ, pðxÞ > pðyÞ, pðxÞ < pðyÞ are still possible.
We postpone the algebraic investigation of this property to a future paper,
remarking that the criterion is trivially met if there is no uncertainty in the if–
then rule (IðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞ 2 D for all ðu; vÞ 2 U  V ). This section identiﬁed one
index of uncertainty associated with L-fuzzy sets; in the next subsection we ﬁt
these ideas into a larger framework focussed on dealing with imprecise
knowledge.
6.2. A view of uncertainty inspired by intuitionistic fuzzy possibility theory
In [18,19,22], an intuitionistic fuzzy extension of possibility theory (in the
sense of Zadeh [68]) was proposed. We brieﬂy recall the main ideas. 9
The central notion in possibility theory is that of a so-called elastic re-
striction that allows us to discriminate between the more or less plausible values
for a variable X in a universe U . In this sense, it reﬂects our uncertainty about
the true value of X . This elastic restriction is modelled by a mapping pX from U
to a set L, whose values represent degrees of possibility, so that pX ðuÞ ¼ l
means that it is possible to degree l 2 L that X takes the value u 2 U . Yet,
typically a mix of positive and negative evidence contributes to our knowledge
about X ; positive evidence here means that we get information that particular
values are to a given extent possible for X , while negative evidence includes
those statements that tell us something about the necessity that X cannot in fact
take a particular value. 10 It therefore appears counterintuitive to let this kind
of information be represented by a single degree (of possibility) for every ele-
ment in the universe, thereby enforcing implicit duality of the degree of ne-
cessity. Indeed, in traditional possibility theory, where L ¼ ½0; 1, two measures
of possibility and necessity of a crisp set A in U are deﬁned:
PX ðAÞ ¼ sup
u2A
pX ðuÞ
NX ðAÞ ¼ inf
u 62A
1 pX ðuÞ
Obviously, NX ðAÞ ¼ 1PX ðcoðAÞÞ, where coðAÞ represents the complement of
A. It makes more sense to have two separate distributions that deﬁne the degree
9 The mentioned references considered also an interval-valued extension of possibility theory,
but we do not consider it here.
10 Note that this two-sided view bears a likeness to a widely used practise in artiﬁcial intelligence
(e.g. in learning processes and in fuzzy rough sets), namely to approximate a concept by giving
positive and negative specimen for it.
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of possibility that X ¼ u and the degree of necessity that X 6¼ u, respectively. In
[22] we suggested to use the membership and non-membership functions of an
intuitionistic fuzzy set for that purpose, such that formally L ¼ L. The re-
sulting distribution pX was called an intuitionistic fuzzy possibility distribution.
The altered measures of possibility and necessity now read:
PX ðAÞ ¼ sup
u2A
pr1ðpX ðuÞÞ
NX ðAÞ ¼ inf
u 62A
pr2ðpX ðuÞÞ
They satisfy a weakened duality, i.e. NX ðAÞ6 1PX ðcoðAÞÞ, embodying the
cognitive constraint that our belief (necessity) that X 6¼ u cannot surpass one
minus the possibility that X ¼ u. 1PX ðAÞ  NX ðAÞ can be used to model
disbelief in (unreliability of) the observer that provided the information.
Let us consider this interpretation in the framework of our GMP example.
A, A0, B and B0 will all represent possibility distributions on their associated
variables. Let us assume at this moment that there is no uncertainty present in
the if–then rule, so AðuÞ 2 D and BðvÞ 2 D for all u 2 U and v 2 V . An inter-
esting situation to study is one in which we completely discredit the observer,
that is pr2ðA0ðuÞÞ ¼ 0 for all u 2 U . An obvious constraint to impose, then, is
the non-credibility of the result: pr2ðB0ðvÞÞ ¼ 0 for all v 2 V , since we do not
want to be forced to make any commitment due to an unreliable observer.
Assuming there exists u 2 V such that AðuÞ ¼ 0L , we have
criTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞ ¼ sup
u2U
TðA0ðuÞ;IðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞÞ
PLTðA0ðuÞ;IðAðuÞ;BðvÞÞÞ
¼TðA0ðuÞ;Ið0L ;BðvÞÞÞ
¼TðA0ðuÞ; 1L Þ
¼ ðpr1ðA0ðuÞÞ; 0Þ
Hence, pr2ðcriTIðA;BÞðA0ÞðvÞÞ ¼ 0 and the desired result is obtained. This result
holds regardless if T is t-representable or not.
In general, we could ask how the uncertainty associated with the observer
should be reﬂected in the result. It is important to note that the discussion on
the propagation of p-values from the previous subsection does not apply here,
because A0 and B0 are (usually) associated with diﬀerent variables X and Y . It
appears that the CRI already takes care of variations in the possibility distri-
bution associated with X ; by enforcing its semantics of inferring the most
speciﬁc distribution on Y consistent with the constraints on X and Y , it puts
bounds on the reliability of the result, expressed by pr2ðB0Þ. Experiments will
have to reveal whether this belief is justiﬁed, and whether the CRI indeed
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operates in accordance with our expectations on the propagation of more or
less reliable information.
6.3. Other challenges and future work
In this short concluding paragraph, we list a few areas in which further work
and/or experiment is mandatory, along with appropriate questions to ask.
• Jenei [41] studied continuity w.r.t. to diﬀerent metrics in the GMP for a par-
ticular subclass of fuzzy quantities (fuzzy sets in R). His results favoured the
Łukasiewicz implicators on ½0; 1. Does this observation extend to L?
• Atanassov and Gargov [3,5] proposed to replace the classical notion of a
tautology with that of an intuitionistic fuzzy tautology (IFT). A formula
P is called an IFT if its truth value x 2 L is such that x1P x2. Not every
IFT is necessarily also a classical tautology. For instance, for the implicator
IMax;Ns in Example 2, the formula Iðx; xÞ ¼ 1L is not a tautology, but is an
IFT since maxðx2; x1ÞP minðx1; x2ÞÞ. IFTs may allow Bustince et al.s crite-
ria to coexist with a modiﬁed version of the Smets–Magrez axioms. This di-
rection has yet to be explored in full depth. Related to this is Kenevan and
Neapolitans [44], and later Entemanns [33] work on a logic with interval
truth values along with a proof theory for it. It was shown that this logic
is ‘‘fuzzy complete’’, that is: all fuzzy tautologies, i.e. formulas P such that
their truth value x 2 L satisﬁes x1P 0:5, can be proven in the theory. The
question then arises whether we could develop something like ‘‘intuitionistic
fuzzy completeness’’.
• IVFSs and IFSs can both be considered as stepping stones in a larger con-
text:
 IVFSs are characterized by membership degrees which are intervals in
½0; 1. Going one step further, type-2 fuzzy sets emerge when we allow
membership degrees themselves to be fuzzy sets in ½0; 1. They have been
receiving a lot of renewed attention lately, amongst others by Mendel [47]
and T€urksen [61], as a vehicle particularly suited to implementing the
computing with words (CWW) paradigm. It is worthwhile to further in-
vestigate the algebraic structure on which type-2 fuzzy sets are deﬁned. In
this sense the theorem by Mizumoto and Tanaka [48] that convex and
normalized type-2 fuzzy sets give way to a bounded lattice is very impor-
tant.
 IFS theory, which is speciﬁcally tuned to the concept of positive (mem-
bership) and negative (non-membership) constituents, can be generalized
by dropping the restriction that lþ m6 1, and by instead drawing ðl; mÞ
from ½0; 12. This extension was coined quadrivalent (i.e. four-valued) fuzzy
logic and was studied e.g. in [13,34].
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7. Conclusion
We have constructed a representation theorem for Łukasiewicz implicators
on the lattice L which serves as the underlying algebraic structure for both
intuitionistic fuzzy and interval-valued fuzzy sets. We have related our results
to the general theory of residuated lattices and MV-algebras, and explained
how to apply them in a practical context to model of diﬀerent kinds of im-
precision.
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